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Abstract 
There exist a vast number of studies on the banking industry. However, the insurance 
industry remains relatively unexplored. Increasingly, Austrian insurance institutions are 
becoming important as financial intermediaries in the domestic market, and – based on 
proximity advantage – also in the Central and Eastern European markets. This paper applies 
the structure, conduct and performance (SCP) approach to a sample of 52 Austrian 
insurance firms. The main finding is that the standard SCP hypothesis of highly concentrated 
markets, which create incentives to engage in collusive behaviour and which in turn leads to 
higher industry profit rates, cannot be supported by the Austrian insurance industry. leads to 
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1. Introduction 
 
The evolution of certain financial intermediaries–especially, in the industrialized 
countries–classified as non-bank financial institutions1 or other financial institutions2 
(OFIs), are increasingly augmenting the traditional roles of banks. Amongst them are 
the insurance company (with its two variants the life insurance and the property and 
loss insurance company), pension funds, finance companies, investment companies, 
venture capital funds, and several security market institutions (investment banks, 
security brokers and dealers, stock exchanges). These institutions constitute the non-
deposit-taking3 branch of a financial system. Whereas banks take deposits from 
numerous lenders and provide loans to borrowers4, non-bank financial institutions do 
not receive their funds as deposits but they provide a wider range of services5 as 
compared to banks. Thus, they differ from banks in the way they receive their funds 
(i.e., there are no loans on the passive side of the balance sheet) and have a distinct 
assets structure that optimally serves their purpose.  
 
In the current study, we will concern ourselves with the Austrian insurance industry. 
Progressively, Austrian insurance institutions are becoming important as financial 
intermediaries in the domestic market, and—based on proximity advantage—also in 
the Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets. North (1993) and Rodrik (1997) 
argue that institutions matter in smoothing the path of globalisation. For that reason 
and from the point of view of the leading role that Austrian firms play as financial 
intermediaries in integrating the CEECs, first into the European Union and second, 
into the global economy, it is noteworthy to gain insights into the functioning of the 
Austrian insurance industry and how its behaviour might be influenced by 
competition and regulatory policies to the benefit of society.  
 
We examine the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) relationship of Austrian 
insurance companies. This standard approach used in industrial economics establishes 
a relationship between the structure of an industry6, firm behavior within this industry 
and the market’s performance. Most empirical studies solely estimate the relationship 
between structure and performance for the fact that there appears to be a positive 
relationship between concentration and profitability7. Thus, when a few dominant 
                                                          
1 Another denomination is non-bank financial intermediary (NBFI). 
2 http://www.ecb.int/home/glossary/html/glosso.en.html 
3 Goacher, Curwen, Apps, Cowdell, Boocok, and Drake, (1987, p. 24 and 27) Finance companies, 
however, are deposit takers but are still classified as a non-bank financial institution. 
4 Fama (1980, p. 39, 42, 44) argues that banks transfer wealth by holding a portfolio of accounts 
operating through debits and credits. A bank’s main output is the loan service. Non-bank financial 
institutions constitute an increasing competition in that industry in recent years because the market is 
demanding for alternatives. 
5 Lee (1966, p. 442) Despite their differences the basic functioning of both, banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries is similar: they both issue debt (securities) and use the proceeds to grant 
credits. 
6 In the SCP framework, industry and market are used equivalently (see for example Curry and George 
1983, p. 213). Our approach in general is to establish an economic definition of the tasks a firm within 
a given industry has to perform in order to be qualified to belong to that particular industry and then 
gather information form various sources to include all relevant firms into the sample. 
7 Molyneux and Forbes (1995) find a positive performance-concentration relationship in the European 
banking market, Mann (1966) finds a higher return in the group of industries with a concentration of 
greater then 70%, Amir (2000, p. 23), however, does not find a clear correlation between concentration 
and profitability. 
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firms produce an industry’s output, firms should be able to yield higher rates of return 
in the long run (Mann, 1966, p. 296). The incumbent’s ability to earn and sustain such 
higher returns depends on an industry’s entry barriers. Berger (1995, p. 404, 429) 
explains this positive concentration-profit relationship by two alternative hypotheses: 
First, the relative market power hypothesis states that only large, well-diversified 
firms can earn higher profits. Alternatively, abnormal returns may be explained by 
superior management and production technology. We test whether the causal 
relationship of high concentration leads to incentives to collude and thus attain higher 
profitability.  
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the status quo 
of the Austrian insurance institutions and draws attention to the increasing 
attractiveness of Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets. Section 3 expounds 
the data and methodology. Section 4 presents and interprets the results, whilst section 
5 concludes the study. 
 
2. The Austrian insurance industry 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
In Austria, the insurance sector is divided into three branches8, instead of the 
conceptual two. These are personal insurance, property insurance and liability 
insurance. Personal insurance covers life insurance, health insurance and casualty 
insurance. Property insurance insures the risk of owning property, which basically 
means that it covers losses due to fire, theft, malpractice, earthquake, automobile 
accidents, and other hazards (Fabozzi and Modigliani 1996, p. 76-78). Liability 
insurance insures against future expected costs, shortfall in revenue or costs arising 
from litigation. Another classification divides insurance contracts into life insurance 
and property and casualty insurance (non-life insurance). This classification is the 
most common in the academic literature9 and that which will be adopted in the current 
study. Thus, in the following the study will adopt the division between life insurance 
companies and property and casualty insurance companies (or non-life insurance 
sector).  
 
There are significant differences between life insurance and property and casualty 
insurance. In the case of a life insurance contract, the event triggering the payment 
can be the death of the income generating part of the family or retirement. Events10 
leading to a payout in the case of a property and casualty insurance are much more 
diverse. As a result, the two branches differ in the certainty with which the occurrence 
of the events can be predicted. For instance, by means of actuarial data11 it is easier to 
predict a person's life expectancy than the probability of a car being involved in an 
accident. 
                                                          
8  „Die Versicherung und ihre einzelnen Sparten“, p.8 
9 See for example Saunders (1997), Mishkin and Eakins (2000), Mishkin (2001) or Fabozzi and 
Modogliani (2003). See also Joskow (1973, p. 378).  
10 A detailed description can be found in Ennsfellner and Gassner-Möstl (2000, p. 93-348) where the 
most important types of insurance are described on p. 96-99, 112, 118, 130, and 159. 
11 The Austrian Statistical Society (Statistik Austria) publishes mortality tables (Sterbetafeln) indicating 
the development of life expectancies for each year of birth divided by men and women. 
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Insurance institutions can be organized as stock companies or as mutual insurance 
association12, meaning that they are owned by the policyholders. The asset allocation 
of the Austrian insurance sector is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen in the figure, 
insurance companies have chosen a very conservative investment strategy with bonds, 
investment certificates (shares in a mutual fund) and loans amounting to roughly 80 % 
of assets. 
 
Figure 1: The asset allocation of Austrian insurance companies 
Bonds
41.81%
Stock
5.34%
Investment 
certificates 
25.14%
Loans and 
prepaid 
premiums 
14.77%
Realty
7.94%
other
5.00%
 
Source: Finanzmarktbericht 2003, p. 95. 
 
In order to reduce a company’s risk exposure several insurance companies may join 
and write a reinsurance contract13, which enables one company to get rid of some risk 
in exchange for parts of the premium. This mainly is relevant for small firms.  
 
 
2.2 The increasing importance of the Austrian insurance institutions  
 
Characteristics of the insurance industry can be examined by means of several 
indicators. One such indicator is the insurance density, which is a measure of 
sophistication of a country’s insurance sector. It is defined as the premiums paid per 
capita. Since 1980 the insurance density pertaining to Austria has increased steadily, 
except for a slack in the year 1996 (see Figure 2). 
                                                          
12 According to § 26 VAG. 
13 Johnson (1977, p. 56) who states that “…reinsurance is nothing more than insurance for insurers.” 
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Figure 2: Track series of Austria’s insurance density 
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Source: www.vvo.at (Wirtschaftsverband Österreich) 
 
From Figure 3, however, the insurance pervasion which is the ratio of the premiums 
paid to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), shows a less volatile pattern than 
the insurance density. The insurance pervasion has been fluctuating within the last 23 
years, reaching an all time high of 5.87 in 1996 to then oscillate between values of 
5.36 and 5.87 in the late nineties and early 2000. 
 
Figure 3: Track series of Austria’s insurance pervasion 
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Source: www.vvo.at (Wirtschaftsverband Österreich) 
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There are other indicators that are also useful in interpreting growth trends of the 
Austrian insurance market. One such indicator is the amount of investment in 
insurance contracts. Investments in Austrian insurance contracts have increased by 
36 % over the past 5 years. The premiums paid in the year 2003 increased by 4.1 % as 
opposed to the year before14. These developments are clear indications that the 
industry is booming. 
 
 
2.3 Austrian insurance institutions and Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The CEE countries represent a high profit potential outlet for Austrian insurance 
companies. Referring to Figure 4, Austria's insurance density exceeds those of all the 
ten new EU member countries in addition to some other eastern European countries 
such as Russia or Romania with the implication that there exists an enormous 
potential to be exploited in these markets by Austrian insurance companies. The 
undeveloped nature of the insurance market in these former communist countries, 
combined with their rapid economic growth trends could provide Austrian insurance 
companies with a first mover advantage. Certainly, Austria’s geographical proximity 
to this region by no means provides an additional advantage for expansion into those 
markets. 
 
Figure 4: The insurance density of various CEE countries 
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Source: Gewinn extra: "Wirtschaftsatlas Österreich im Zentrum der EU Erweiterung" 
 
Other economic developments also help to explain the region's high potential. For 
example, the premiums paid for insurance contracts have been growing at 13.9 % on 
the average in the new EU member countries as opposed to 8.2 % in the former EU-
15. Poland is said to bear the highest potential in the life insurance sector since it 
accounts for almost half of the market of the new EU member countries. 
Traditionally, Austrian companies are very much involved in their neighbouring 
countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia15. 
 
                                                          
14 “Finanzmarktbericht 2003“ 
15 “Gewinn extra: Wirtschaftsatlas Österreich im Zentrum der EU Erweiterung", 6e/04, Juni 2004 
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Basically, the economies of the CEE countries have been growing at a much faster 
rate than Austria’s economy and this trend is expected to continue into the future as 
illustrated by Figures 5 and 6 below. Indeed, the region denoted as Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as Southern and Eastern Europe is expected to grow at rates 
well above 3 % p.a. which is two to three times the predicted growth rate for Austria. 
This offers bright prospects for Austrian companies.  
 
Figure 5: Real GDP growth in CEE 
 
 
 
 
 
(source: “Volkswirtschaft – Ziele und Aufgaben”, www.wibico.at) 
          
 
 
          
CEEC-516: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia 
 
SOE (Southern and Eastern Europe): Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia 
 
Figure 6: Austria’s actual and forecasted GDP growth 
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Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (ÖNB)17 
 
It is interesting to assess the extent to which foreign firms in general invest in assets 
of the CEE markets. An important indicator capturing this effect is foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Blanchard (2000, p. 470) defines FDI as the purchase of firms or 
the development of new plants by foreign firms. Table 1 presents FDIs of the various 
CEE countries, expressed as an absolute amount for the years 2001 through 2005. In 
addition, the table displays FDI as a percentage of GDP of those countries for the year 
2003. 
                                                          
16 Definitions according to a telephone conversation with Stefan Bruckbauer, deputy head of 
Konzernvolkswirtschaft, Bank Austria-Creditanstalt (BA-CA) on February 10th, 2005. 
17 For historical numbers see http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?&lang=DE&report=7.3 and for 
forecasts see http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?&lang=DE&report=7.2.1 
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Table 1: FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (mill. Euros) 
Country 2001 2002 2004 2005
Bosnia and Herzegowina 133 275 335 5,40% 310 320
Bulgaria 896 951 1235 7,02% 2000 1800
Croatia 1743 1188 1727 6,77% 850 1100
Czech Republic 6114 8791 2086 2,62% 3462 4811
Estonia 377 167 670 8,38% 540 510
Hungary 2303 2669 2320 3,17% 2500 2800
Latvia 126 265 235 2,40% 372 369
Lithuania 490 754 126 0,77% 700 640
Macedonia 492 82 83 2,02% 120 120
Poland 6373 4371 3760 2,06% 4090 4500
Romania 1312 1194 1590 3,16% 3000 2500
Russia 3423 3866 5243 1,37% 6800 4600
Serbia and Montenegro 184 594 1232 6,73% 600 1000
Slovakia 1674 4069 520 1,80% 1340 1780
Slovenia 251 1582 -115 -0,47% 200 400
Ukraine 858 732 1260 2,89% 1300 1200
2003
 
 
Source: CEE Economics Data 
 
The table reveals that FDI is quite low for most of the countries in 2003. For some 
countries, however, FDI amounted up to 5-8 % of GDP in 2003. FDI is expected to 
increase by 65 % on average from the year 2001 until the year 2005 for the whole 
region18. The table reveals the fact that most CEE countries have not yet succeeded in 
attracting foreign investors. In view of the highly predicted growth rates, firms from 
western European countries could gain a first mover advantage by investing in assets 
in the CEE region.  
 
In addition, the economies of all the ten new member states have been boosted by 
their 2004 EU accession. A general trend that the new EU member countries are 
economically on an upswing can be observed19. This is a logical consequence of 
economic, social and political improvements that have had to be implemented in order 
to become full EU member states. 
 
 
                                                          
18 “CEE Economic Data – Outlook for 2005” 
19 “CEE Report – Business Information on Central and Eastern Europe“ 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The structure-conduct-performance approach 
 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach20 is a standard economics tool 
used in analysing industries. The approach establishes a causal relationship between 
industry structure, firm conduct and market performance. Empirically, the relationship 
between structure and performance is more easily observable (Carlton and Perloff, 
2000). Typically, firm conduct is omitted from such analyses since measurement from 
given data poses severe problems. 
 
Once the relationship has been established, the resultant information then can be used 
to set policy goals. In this context, Jerger (2004, p. 15) distinguishes between 
competition policy and regulatory policy. Competition policy attempts to influence 
industry structure while regulatory policy aims to alter the economic agent’s conduct. 
Not all of the mentioned criteria will be useful in the current study, due to the fact that 
some are not applicable–to a large extent–to financial companies. 
 
Prior to defining the structural, behavioural and performance variables, one has to 
analyse the basic demand and supply conditions of the insurance institutional sector. 
In addition, Neuberger (1997, p. 3,4) suggests that uncertainty, asymmetric 
information and transaction costs be examined as well, in order to help explain basic 
market conditions. The foregoing discussion is summarized in Figure 7 below. 
 
                                                          
20 See for example Waldmann and Jensen (1998. p. 7). 
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Figure 7: The SCP Paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Waldman and Jensen (1998, p. 7), Jerger (2004, p. 15) and Neuberger (1997, p. 3,4) 
 
 
When preparing a SCP analysis one systematically goes through the following steps: 
first, a set of structural variables is selected and defined. Second, variables measuring 
firm conduct have to be identified. Finally, market performance measures have to be 
specified. 
Basic Market Conditions 
Demand Conditions 
Price elasticity 
Substitutes 
Market growth 
Type of good 
Method of purchase 
Supply Conditions 
Technology 
Raw materials 
Unionization 
Product durability
Location 
Market Structure 
Firm Conduct 
Performance 
Number of buyers and sellers
Product differentiation 
Barriers to entry and exit 
Vertical integration 
Diversification 
Cost structures 
Pricing strategies 
Product strategies 
Advertising 
R&D 
Plant investment 
Collusion 
Mergers 
Legal 
strategies
Allocative efficiency 
Production efficiency 
Rate of technological advance
Quality and service 
Equity 
Uncertainty                  Transaction costs 
Asymmetric Information 
Competition policy 
Regulatory policy 
 10
3.1.1 Defining the structural variables  
 
A commonly used indicator is the market concentration ratio. It is defined as the 
accumulated percentage of market share21 of the 4, 8, 10 (or some other number) 
largest firms in the industry. Usually, the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is used 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990). Theory predicts high market power in terms of price setting 
ability if the CR4 has a high value. The explanation for a high value of the CR4 is that 
only a few firms account for the major share of economic activity in the market. 
 
A measure closely related to the market concentration ratio is the Herfindahl 
Hirschmann Index (HH-Index). It is defined as the sum of the ith firm’s squared 
market share considering all the market relevant firms. Clearly the weights assigned 
to big players in a market are relatively larger than for small firms. Formally, the HH-
Index is expressed as: 
 
∑=− 2iSIndexHH      (1) 
 
with Si = market share of the ith firm. 
 
The index can either be expressed in absolute terms or as a percentage. A high HH-
Index indicates a few dominant firms with a large market share each. A low HH-
Index infers a market consisting of a large amount of firms each with a small market 
share. These results are important in analysing the type of market structure (i.e., 
monopolistic competition, oligopoly or perfect competition). 
 
A categorization for HH-Index values proposed by the European Commission on 
Competition Policy22 foresees that a value below 1000 suggests a low market 
concentration, a value between 1000 and 1800 a medium concentration and a HH-
Index of 1800 or above indicates a highly concentrated market. 
 
It is argued that the HH-Index outperforms the concentration ratio23 in terms of 
expressiveness. Results obtained by Kwoka (1979, p. 103), however, do not support 
this thesis. According to Hall and Tideman (1967), the most important axioms that a 
concentration measure should satisfy are as follows: 
 
1. If one firm augments its market share with a resulting reduction of another firm’s 
market share then the concentration should increase (principle of transfers)24. 
2. If entry of a new firm occurs concentration should decrease. 
3. If mergers occur concentration should increase. 
 
These axioms cannot be met by a measure like the concentration ratio that does not 
capture all the firms of an industry since changes outside the considered group of 
                                                          
21 Curry (1983, p. 213) argues that revenues as a measure of market share are preferable for the analysis 
of firms within the same market and especially preferred over assets since these heavily depend on 
accounting rules. Unfortunately, It is not possible to consistently compute market share using revenues 
since in some cases only balance sheet data is available and therefore total assets have to taken. 
22 http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/glossary_en.html 
23 Hall and Tideman (1967, p. 165) argue that the HH- Index is superior to the concentration ratio with 
respect to certain criteria which the most important ones have been presented in this section. 
24 See also Hall and Tideman (1967, p. 164). 
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firms are neglected25. Following Curry (1983, p. 207), on the other hand, the HH-
Index does satisfy all the above-mentioned axioms and is from this point of view 
superior to the CR426. 
 
In addition to the preceding concepts, one often considers a measure of barriers to 
entry as a structural variable. These can generally be defined as the fixed costs of 
entry27,28 for new entrants according to Jerger (2004, p. 15). Baumol and Willig 
(1981, p. 408) state that there is no equivalent cost for the incumbent firms. Three 
common barriers to entry are used in a SCP analysis according to Bain (1956): (1) 
economies of scale, (2) product differentiation advantages, and (3) absolute cost 
advantages. The impact of barriers to entry is visible in “…the advantages of 
established sellers…reflected in the extent to which [they] can persistently raise their 
prices above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry29”. 
Thus, barriers to entry are a means of incumbent firms’ ability to protect a profitable 
industry from competition. 
 
Most studies solely focus on the concentration-profit relationship but as Bain (1956, 
p. 201) puts it, one has to consider “…that seller concentration alone is not an 
adequate indicator of the… excess profits… The concurrent influence of the condition 
of entry should clearly be taken into account.30” Schmalensee (1989, p. 968) defines 
an adequate measure of economies of scale as the ratio of a firm of minimum efficient 
scale (MES) to the market output: 
 
OutputMarket
MESScaleofEconomies =    (2) 
 
MES is the output level that relative to demand minimizes the average costs (Carlton 
and Perloff, 2000, p. 41; or Varian, 1999, p. 427). It can be approximated by the 
average firm31 size of the largest firms accounting for half of the industry output. In 
our study we adopt this approximation. Comanor and Wilson (1967, p. 428) an 
Kwoka (1979, p. 102) recommend this measure to be divided by the market’s total 
                                                          
25 Curry (1983, p. 207) points out that the CR4 is unaffected by a shift in market share from one firm to 
another within the largest four firms when no turnover within the same group occurs. See also Hall and 
Tideman (1967. p. 165). 
26 Hall and (1967) introduce a new concentration measure called TH- Index which fulfills all their 
properties and which turns out to be superior to all existing measures of concentration. This measure is 
not chosen since it is shown to be highly correlated with the well-known HH-Index. 
27 Baumol and Willig (1981, p. 416-417) state, however, that fixed costs constitute a barrier to entry but 
can be distinguished in three major points:  (1) fixed costs unlike entry barriers do not lead to 
suboptimal industry performance, (2) if an entry barrier can be expressed in costs it need not be fixed 
costs and (3) entry costs, not fixed costs, may be influenced by incumbents in order to protect their 
status (see also Caves and Porter (1977, p. 246) for this reasoning). 
28 Comanor and Wilson (1967 p. 426) relate these fixed costs to advertising expenses but the logic 
behind applies to all expenses. They argue that if there exists a threshold expense in order not to lose 
market share, larger firms can more easily spread these costs among different lines of business than 
smaller firms and, therefore, reduce average unit costs. 
29 Bain (1956, p. 3) 
30 Mann (1966, p. 268-300) finds that barriers of entry have a separate influence on profit rates apart 
from the influence of concentration. He finds a higher average profitability in the high than in the 
medium and low barrier groups. 
31 Comanor and Wilson (1967, p. 428) suggest to take plant size rather than firm size. Since we are 
talking about financial intermediaries which produce services it is reasonable to use firm size. 
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output which results in a variable approximating scale economies. The higher this 
measure, the greater the influence of economies of scale.  
 
3.1.2 Defining variables of firm conduct 
 
The common variables used as indicators for a firm’s conduct are pricing strategies, 
advertising expenditures, R&D expenditures (Jerger, 2004, p. 16), and diversification 
(Jacobson and Adréosso-O’Callaghan, 1996, p. 151 and 168). Advertising 
expenditures are used in order to approximate product differentiation. Others are 
shown in Figure 7. In addition, the Lerner Index developed by Lerner (1934), 
measures the degree to which a firm can exercise monopoly power32 by measuring the 
deviation of price from marginal costs 33 (see e.g., Miller; 1955, p. 123,124). Usually, 
it is not possible to obtain estimates for most of the variables required for calculating 
these measures. As a result, this section will focus on measures of collusion, which 
basically describe the state in which the largest firms in a market jointly set prices 
above the competitive level. 
 
3.1.2.1 Collusion 
 
Measuring collusion by means of an index or ratio is a difficult task, primarily 
because collusion is a legal term (Asch and Seneca, 1975, p. 225). There are distinct 
economic outcomes though. Thus, the approach suggested by Geroski (1988, p. 108), 
which is mainly used in empirical studies, relies on the observation of variables that 
render collusion and its outcome, namely higher profits more likely. These variables 
listed by Asch et al. (1975, p. 224, 225) are mainly those describing market structure: 
industry concentration, barriers to entry, product differentiation, firm size and 
diversification (the latter two being at the firm level). Thus, we can see that a SCP 
analysis could be broken down to only the structure-profitability relationship. 
 
 
3.1.3 Defining measures of market performance 
 
There is a vast range of possible ways to measure a firm’s profitability. In general, we 
are concerned with identifying a largely unbiased rate of return defined as profit per 
unit of sacrifice as exemplified by Miller (1969 p. 108). When computing a firm’s 
profitability one can generally choose between accounting based measures or market 
based measures. All accounting based measures of performance follow the same 
principle and therefore suffer from the same inconsistencies discussed below. The 
accounting rate of return has been shown34 to be a misleading indicator of firm 
performance. Despite its drawbacks, it is still widely used because it offers an 
approximation that can also be easily calculated. The simple principle of an 
accounting ratio is to relate the investment to the stream of profits it generates. There 
are different methods of expressing such a ratio discussed in this section. 
 
                                                          
32 Some textbooks, however, list that particular index as a measure of profitability. See for example 
Waldman and Jensen (1998, p. 437, 438) or Carlton and Perloff (2000, p. 246) 
33 Developed by Abba P. Lerner in his pioneering work Lerner (1934, p. 169). 
34 See for example Fisher and McGowan (1983) or Waldman et al. (1998 p. 434) 
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The true yield, or internal rate of return35,36 (IRR), is the only unbiased measure of a 
company’s performance. When calculating the IRR one would have to predict all 
future cash flows. This method lacks objectivity since it highly depends on the 
forecasts. Due to the difficulties in computing the IRR, the only feasible way to assess 
a company’s profitability is to calculate an approximation37. 
 
A rate of return is not equivalent to a true yield for the following reasons: First, since 
accounting ratios depend on the underlying figures and, as result, on the accounting 
rules applied or the inventory valuation method, one will obtain different numbers 
when computing the same ratio using accounting statements established according to 
different rules (US-GAAP, IAS, Austrian HGB). 
 
A second drawback constitutes the treatment of certain positions. Depreciation, for 
example, does not affect an actual cash outflow but is treated as such in the profit and 
loss (P&L) statement. This results in hidden reserves, which actually, are assets 
employed in the income generating process but are no longer visible as such in the 
financial statement. 
 
Third, when adopting a value creation point of view one has to reconsider the 
treatment of capital expenditures (Demsetz 1982, p. 47) such as research and 
development (R&D) (Fisher and McGowan 1983, p. 82) and advertising expenditures 
to achieve consistency with an economist’s definition of profits. These two prime 
examples rather constitute an investment yielding a deferred payoff and should, 
therefore, be considered as capital invested in the operations38 as suggested by 
Grabowski and Mueller (1978, p. 329). The aforementioned points give rise to the 
need for reorganizing balance sheet and P&L data in order to compute meaningful 
ratios. There are, however, objections39 to the capitalization of such expenditures. It is 
argued that this might even yield a larger error. 
 
Accounting based fundamentals are easily computed and data is available to outsiders. 
However, most of those multiples do not satisfy the requirements set out above. The 
return on assets (ROA) is not suitable for the present study due to the “overall” 
approach and the limited statements that can be drawn from it. The return on equity 
(ROE) leaves aside the fact that the operating income is earned using both, equity and 
debt. A more appropriate measure is the return on invested capital (ROIC), which 
relates net operating profit less adjusted tax (NOPLAT) to the invested capital. The 
concept of corporate performance called economic value added (EVA) is expressed in 
                                                          
35 The IRR is defined as the rate that makes a project’s initial investment and its future expected cash 
flows equal to zero. For a definition see for example Brealy and Myers (2003, p. 96), Fischer (1996, p. 
39) or Grinblatt and Titman (2002, p. 345).  
36 Solomon and Laya (1967, p.157) and Fisher et al. (1983, p. 82) argue that the IRR can be applied to a 
company’s profitability when we consider a company as a bundle of projects each yielding a certain 
return.  
37 Solomon et al. (1967) argue that accounting statements do contain the required information and, 
therefore, a book rate or return should be calculated as an approximation. 
38 These two items do not appear in our investigation though. They are just mentioned as examples and 
shall reflect the point of view that we take on profitability: we are concerned, which will be shown 
subsequently, with reorganizing data in such a way that invested capital and profit both are best 
approximated to their true value within the operations. 
39 See for example Stauffer (1971, p. 435). 
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money terms and incorporates all relevant details40 to measure true profit. It is 
rejected due to the difficulty in determining the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC), which requires the use of an asset-pricing model41 in order to compute the 
return to equity holders. In addition the return to debt holders has to be estimated 
which is quite an involving undertaking when a firm issues diverse debt instruments. 
 
Market based measures are said to be the true indicator of profitability (Hancock et 
al., 2001, p. 5) since the market is assumed to be efficient in organizing and 
interpreting information and, therefore, pricing securities and firms. There are, 
however, difficulties in computing market based measures. Furthermore, all market-
based measures imply that the company’s stock is traded which is not always the case. 
Tobin’s q serves as an indicator of the management’s ability to run the operations 
profitably. However, Tobin’s q is rejected as a profitability measure in the current 
analysis since assumptions about the replacement costs have to be made and this 
approach lacks objectivity compared to a book rate of return42. Alternatively, the 
market value added (MVA) or market to capital ratio is defined as the market value of 
a firm’s equity and debt minus the capital invested or the ratio of these two numbers. 
Those measures require the availability of market data, which is often not given. 
 
In view of the above-mentioned reasons, the return on invested capital (ROIC) is 
chosen in the present analysis43. Reese and Cool (1978, p. 29) point out that ROIC 
bears some distinct advantages as an accounting based measure44: (1) as a ratio it 
allows for comparability across firms and even industries; (2) being expressed as a 
return on capital it enables comparison with the cost of capital (also expressed in 
percentage terms); and (3) it is easily computed by outsiders. ROIC is preferred over 
Tobin’s q due to its difficulty in measuring the firm’s replacement costs. In addition, 
under certain circumstances45 the error in estimating the book rate of return is smaller 
than the error in estimating Tobin’s q. Finally, McFarland (1988, p. 620-622) finds 
that both, Tobin’s q and the book rate of return are highly correlated to the true 
economic profitability. EVA is not used in the study due to its absolute denomination 
and the difficulties in computing the WACC. 
 
3.1.3.1 Framework for computing the performance46 
 
As stated above, ROIC is found to be the optimal measure needed to assess a firm’s 
profitability. In order to calculate the ROIC the framework suggested by Copeland et 
al. (2000) is adopted. Copeland et al. (2000, ch. 4 and p. 137-143) argue that the 
ROIC is one of the drivers of firm value. Using this framework one has to reorganize 
                                                          
40 EVA measures the excess amount of cash a firm earns over its costs especially including opportunity 
costs as financing costs which is not given when considering a book rate of return on its own. See for 
example Reese and Cool (1978, p. 30). 
41 Such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
42 Alternatively, Hirschey (1985) suggests the relative excess valuation which is defined as the market 
value of a firm less the book value of its tangible assets divided by sales. 
43 The choice of an accounting based measure is also in line with past research, see for example 
Hirschey (1985, p. 91). 
44 Hirschey (1984, p. 375) points out the fact that accounting data is the best data available to outsiders. 
45 MacFarland (1988,  p. 615) shows that if a firm’s intangible assets grow at a rate smaller than the 
rate of return, the error in estimating a book rate of return is smaller than in estimating Tobin’s q. 
46 The following section is based on Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000, ch. 9) 
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balance sheet and P&L data47 in order to compute the optimal approximation. The 
goal is to obtain more of an economic performance than an accounting view. One has 
to avoid inconsistencies between the numerator and the denominator. This means that 
the income generated by assets included in the invested capital should be considered 
in NOPLAT and vice versa. 
 
It has been argued earlier that ROIC is the most adequate measure of corporate 
performance. Formally, ROIC is defined as net operating profit less adjusted taxes 
divided by invested capital: 
 
capitalinvested
NOPLATROIC =      (3) 
 
The nominator (NOPLAT) is calculated using the P&L statement. The starting point 
is EBITDA48 (earnings before interest, taxes and amortization). It includes all types of 
operating income. EBITDA is calculated starting with profit before tax (PBT). In 
order to obtain EBITDA, the interest expense as well as the depreciation is added. 
PBT does not include extraordinary earnings or expenses. This fact is in line with the 
framework by Copeland et al. (2000). Copeland et al. (2000, p. 164) also recommend 
that interest income be excluded from the NOPLAT calculation. This approach, 
however, is not followed since a financial institution’s profitability49 is measured. The 
taxes50 disclosed in the P&L statement have to be deducted. Finally, taxes on non-
operating income have to be added back51 to EBITDA. This yields the information 
depicted by Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: NOPLAT calculation 
 
PBT 
+ interestexpense 
+ depreciation of fixed assets 
EBITDA 
– taxes on EBITDA  
– tax on non-operating income 
NOPLAT 
 
Source: Copeland et al. ( 2000) 
 
According to this calculation, NOPLAT is a concept that incorporates everything 
considered to be essential when analysing a financial company: (1) interest income 
and expense have been addressed, and (2) non-operating income has been deducted. 
 
In order to compute the amount of capital that has been invested by shareholders and 
creditors (operating invested capital) one starts with total assets. First, non-operating 
                                                          
47 The need for adjustments is also pointed out by Carlton and Perloff (2000, p. 239). 
48 See http://boersenlexikon.faz.net/ebitda.htm for a definition of EBITDA. 
49 Therefore, the tax shield is not deducted as well. 
50 Including current and deferred taxes.  
51 The (flat) tax rate for legal entities amounted 34 % in 2003, see § 22 (1) KstG in: Kodex 
Steuergesetze 15.10.2002.  
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assets are deducted from total assets52. Subsequently, non-interest bearing current 
liabilities have to be netted out. These are typically liabilities that are payable on 
deferred terms and have a short-term character (i.e., certain liabilities to business 
partners or tax liabilities). Formally, one can express these calculations as represented 
in Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3: Invested capital calculation 
 
Total assets 
– non-operating current assets 
– non-interest bearing current liabilities 
Operating invested capital 
 
Source: Copeland et al. (2000) 
 
In order to facilitate valuation, excess cash has to be deducted, treating it as temporary 
imbalances. Given that a one period profitability measure is computed, excess cash is 
not deducted. This would not be consistent with the economic definition of a 
return53,54. The capital invested is measured as an average of the beginning (1-1-2003) 
and end of the period (31-12-2003) capital, as suggested by Copeland et al. (2000. p. 
165) and Egger and Samer (1999, p. 526).  
 
3.2 The data 
 
Throughout the analysis, financial statement data is used55. Some drawbacks that this 
methodology presents have already been highlighted. Others will be mentioned here. 
First and foremost, small56 limited liability companies are not required to disclose a 
P&L statement according to Austrian commercial law57. This imposes severe 
limitations on the calculations. More broadly, the nature of financial statements 
restricts the computations. 
 
Second, certain variables cannot be computed from the available database. Especially, 
the variables of firm conduct presented earlier can barely be computed. Those 
variables could only be described verbally instead. Third, some companies choose a 
financial year different from the calendar year. However, since it does not deviate 
much from the calendar year, ratios are computed ignoring this deviation. 
 
In the following, we will characterize the insurance industry by the chosen structural 
variables that have been discussed in the previous section. In addition, all other 
relevant information and their corresponding peculiarities would be highlighted. The 
                                                          
52 According to Frick (2001, p. 188) the position accounts receivables is typically not related to 
revenues. 
53 Although, Copeland et al. (2000) argue that excess cash is typically not related to a company’s 
operations but we do not see a fact that disproves that this cash balance has not been generated with the 
capital invested and thus is a part of a firm’s profitability. 
54 In addition, cash is used to cover potential losses that might occur to security holders or 
policyholders and thus has an operational character. 
55 The primary source for financial statements is the industrial court. Some companies publish their 
statements in the official journal of the “Wiener Zeitung”. Only a few companies make their financial 
statements available online. 
56 See § 221 HGB for the size categorization. 
57 § 278 HGB 
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market share variable is obtained using published data by the Association of the 
insurance companies in Austria (VVO) as in the case of the life insurance industry. 
Else, market share is computed using revenues. In financial theory, the rate of return 
on government bonds is widely accepted as a risk free benchmark return. The return 
on a government bond, which was 4 % for the year 2003, was used as a proxy58. 
 
3.3 Limitations of the study 
 
The present study draws criticism along the following lines: being based on a one-
period analysis, and relying solely on accounting data presents some drawbacks. The 
results obtained can only be interpreted in that light. In the absence of data containing 
the relevant information, however, accounting data is the most reliable data available. 
Second, one has to bear in mind that this study does not make any statements about 
changes over time. It constitutes a “snapshot” showing the current situation of the 
insurance industry for the year 2003 over the year 2002. Nevertheless, the study 
represents the most recent situation for which data was available. Moreover, it is the 
first of its kind to make an attempt at applying SCP analysis to the Austrian insurance 
industry. 
 
 
4. Results and interpretation 
 
4.1 The life insurance industry 
 
4.1.1 Structure 
 
The results of the study are derived from Appendices 1 and 2. Domestic market 
participants of both the life and the non-life insurance industry can be found on the 
FMA’s webpage59,60 (Financial Market Authority). The vast majority of life insurance 
companies are stock companies. For example, in the year 2003, 37 life insurance 
companies conducted business (32 as corporations, 4 as mutual insurance association, 
and 1 as a limited liability company). Of the 37 companies, 5 were pure life insurance 
companies. Generali Versicherung AG merged with Interunfall Versicherung AG in 
September 200461; both companies are represented on the list for 2003. 
 
Health insurance is a constituent part of life insurance. In most cases, life insurance in 
the narrow sense and health insurance are disclosed separately in the company’s 
financial statement. Thus, both were consolidated into one component in order to 
achieve consistency with the definition adopted in this study. Market share was 
calculated using data published by the VVÖ62. With a CR4 of 42.65 %, the results 
reveal that the four largest firms in the industry accounted for less than 50 % market 
share, thereby implying that the Austrian life insurance industry can be characterized 
                                                          
58 http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?&lang=DE&report=2.11 
59 http://www.fma.gv.at/en/fma/marketpa/insuranc/domestic.htm 
60 Companies that are organized as small mutual insurance associations (§ 62 VAG) do not represent a 
large share of the market (according to a telephone interview with DI Pareder, Department of Reporting 
and Statistics, Austrian National Bank) and are, therefore, not included in the list. See also: 
“Finanzmarktbericht 2003“, p. 88 supporting that logic. 
61 http://www.generali.at/__C1256A6F0044EA06.nsf/0/724854A9F05743B0C1256F010027482E?  
OpenDocument 
62 www.vvo.at 
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as an industry with a low concentration and a significant number of firms. The HH-
index of 689, which is far below the EU-stipulated threshold value of 1000, confirms 
this view. Furthermore, the measure of the economies of scale is quite low. 
 
4.1.2 Conduct 
 
From the given data, it was not possible to compute the Lerner Index. The reason 
being that the P&L statement of the insurance companies is divided into respectively, 
a technical statement and a non-technical statement, both of which do not reveal the 
information needed. Analysis of the given market structure and profitability data, did 
not support the thesis of few firms colluding and earning higher profits than the firms 
at the fringe. The average profitability (in terms of ROIC) of the four largest players 
(0.50 %) is virtually the same as for the rest of the market (0.43 %). Thus, the life 
insurance market cannot be characterised by colluding firms. 
 
4.1.3 Performance 
 
The industry profit rates were found to be very low with the average profit rate 
amounting to 0.44 %. This suggests a mature industry with characteristics close to 
perfect competition. Only three firms yielded a return of 1 % or more. No firm is able 
to yield abnormal returns. Compared to the benchmark rate of return, investors would 
have been better off investing in risk-free government bonds than putting their money 
into insurance contracts. The generally low performance of the Austrian Stock 
Exchange at the time could have partially contributed to the low performance of the 
insurance industry. 
 
4.2 The non-life insurance industry 
 
4.2.1 Structure63 
 
Contrary to the life insurance industry the non-life insurance industry is highly 
concentrated. Both, the HH-index of 2785 as well as the CR4 of 81.16 % suggest the 
existence of a highly concentrated market. There are two market leaders, UNIQA 
Versicherung AG and Generali Holding Vienna AG, together accounting for 73 % of 
industry assets. Each of the other market participants accounted for less than 5 % 
market share. Although the market leaders account for the major share of the industry 
they yield rather poor results in terms of ROIC. Economies of scale are reasonably 
significant. On the whole, the market structure results for the Austrian non-life 
insurance industry point in the direction of an industry where firms have an incentive 
to collude. 
 
4.2.2 Conduct 
 
As in the case of life insurance companies, the Lerner Index cannot be computed. The 
hypothesis that the two market leaders that account for the major part of the industry 
assets collude in order to raise profits cannot be supported. Average profitability of 
the two market leaders accounting for about 73 % market share is 0.3676 % as 
                                                          
63 The company General Cologne Re Rückversicherungs-AG is dropped although it is mentioned on 
the FMA’s list since it is neither an Austrian company nor an Austrian subsidiary. 
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opposed to 1.7296 % for the remaining firms. Thus, the two market leaders are not 
able to collude. As an interesting observation, one firm that accounted for only 
0.026 % market share generated the highest profit of 14.169 %. 
 
4.2.3 Performance 
 
Returns across the sample of firms in the non-life insurance sector were found to have 
a much more higher variance than those in the life insurance sample and as mentioned 
earlier, one of the smallest companies–Union Versicherungs AG–surprisingly yielded 
the highest profit. One could even observe situations of negative structure-profit 
relationships, i.e., higher profits occurred rather in the lower third of the industry. The 
average profitability was 0.0783 % for the first 15 firms, 0.9938 % for the next 16 
firms and 3.9843 % for the last 15 firms, due to the high performance of Union 
Versicherungs AG and Bank Austria Creditanstalt Versicherung AG–two fringe firms 
with market shares of less then 1 %. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 
The main aim of this research is to fill a blank spot that exists in the analysis of 
Austrian insurance industry. There exist a vast number of studies on banks and 
banking markets. However, the insurance industry seems to remain relatively 
unexplored. In view of the ever-increasing importance of the global insurance 
industry–and that of Austria in particular–as a financial intermediary, it has become 
imperative to investigate this sector of the Austrian economy. The present study 
applies the structure, conduct and performance (SCP) method to a sample of 52 firms. 
The main finding is that the standard SCP hypothesis of highly concentrated markets, 
which create incentives to engage in collusive behaviour and which in turn leads to 
higher industry profit rates cannot be supported by the Austrian insurance industry. 
Arguably, the firms face intra-industry competitive pressures in obtaining 
policyholders and extra-industry competitive pressures in locating investment outlets. 
 
Berger and Humphrey (1997, p. 21) suggest that the primary contributions of an SCP 
study be grouped into three cases: 
 
• to inform government policy; 
• to address general research issues and; 
• to improve managerial performance. 
 
According to the SCP paradigm, higher market share leads to higher market power in 
terms of the ability to increase prices and thus ultimately lead to higher returns. 
Theory predicts a positive relationship between market concentration (measured by 
either CR4 or the HH-Index) and profitability64. The Austrian life insurance sector 
shows no sign of such a causal relationship: it is a mature and competitive industry. 
The non-life insurance industry shows a high market concentration but no sign of 
collusion and in addition a low overall level of performance.  
 
                                                          
64 See for example Miller (1969 p. 105). 
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There are several parties that might show interest in the current study. First, there are 
two important regulatory entities in Austria surveying the conduct of firms within an 
industry. The federal competition authority is responsible for detecting violations 
against competitive restrictions65. Also, the federal cartel prosecutor represents public 
interests in such matters at the industrial court66. Both bodies are interested in 
establishing whether anticompetitive rules have been violated and could be 
beneficiaries of the study. 
 
Managers of the firms surveyed constitute a second group to which this study might 
be of interest. It provides a useful comparison in terms of profitability across firms. 
Executives might find it interesting to analyse the aggregated results and set their 
business policy in terms of, for example, mergers and acquisition in order to benefit 
from economies of scale and thereby improve their profit situations. This refers 
especially to the life insurance industry that suffered from very low returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 http://www.bwb.gv.at/BWB/Aufgaben/default.htm 
66 “Leitbild des Bundeskartellanwalts”, www.bmj.gv.at/_cms_upload/_docs/bka_leitbild.pdf?nav=65 
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Appendix 1 
 
Life insurance industry SCP summary 
 
  Insurance Companies Market share 
Cumulative 
market share ROIC 
      
  Sparkassen Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 13.32% 13.32% 0.4580% 
  Wiener Städtische Allgemeine Versicherung AG 12.07% 25.39% 0.4331% 
  Raiffeisen Versicherung AG 10.24% 35.63% 0.5702% 
  UNIQA Personenversicherung AG 7.02% 42.65% 0.5361% 
  Generali Versicherung AG 6.97% 49.62% 0.1628% 
  Allianz Elementar Lebensversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 6.13% 55.75% n/a 
  Wüstenrot Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 5.76% 61.51% 0.2342% 
  Union Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 5.23% 66.74% 1.0251% 
  Donau Allgemeine Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 3.18% 69.92% 0.7740% 
  Skandia Leben AG Lebensversicherungs-AG 2.60% 72.52% 0.5774% 
  Interunfall Versicherung AG 2.50% 75.02% 0.0411% 
  Bank Austria Creditanstalt Versicherung AG 2.41% 77.43% 0.5772% 
  Victoria-Volksbanken Versicherungsaktiengesellschaft 2.40% 79.83% 0.2291% 
  Finance Life Lebensversicherung AG 2.39% 82.22% 0.1715% 
  
Österreichische Beamtenversicherung Versicherungsverein 
auf Gegenseitigkeit 2.30% 84.52% 0.1813% 
  Zürich Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 2.09% 86.61% 0.5045% 
  Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich 1.56% 88.17% 0.2727% 
  BAWAG-Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 1.54% 89.71% 0.3200% 
  Oberösterreichische Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 1.54% 91.25% 0.1449% 
  Der Anker Allgemeine Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 1.48% 92.73% 0.1837% 
  Grazer Wechselseitige Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 1.39% 94.12% 0.7760% 
  ASPECTA Lebensversicherung AG Niederlassung Österreich 1.03% 95.15% n/a 
  Postversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 1.01% 96.16% 1.3363% 
  Merkur Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.80% 96.96% 0.1765% 
  Die niederösterreichische Versicherung 0.59% 97.55% 0.0244% 
  Gerling Financial Services GmbH (Gerling-Konzern Leben) 0.37% 97.92% 0.3019% 
  Vorarlberger Landes-Versicherung V. a. G. 0.35% 98.27% 0.2746% 
  Basler Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft In Österreich 0.34% 98.61% 0.1592% 
  Drei-Banken Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.33% 98.94% 0.6036% 
  Hypo Versicherung AG 0.24% 99.18% 0.2434% 
  Tiroler Landes-Versicherungsanstalt V. a. G. 0.22% 99.40% 0.1031% 
  Salzburger Landes-Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.19% 99.59% 0.6060% 
  Quelle Lebensversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.17% 99.76% 0.3528% 
  Kärntner Landesversicherung auf Gegenseitigkeit 0.11% 99.87% 0.3386% 
  APK-Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.04% 99.91% 0.4104% 
  CALL DIRECT Versicherung AG 0.04% 99.95% 2.8445% 
  HDI Hannover Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.02% 99.97% -0.6576% 
      
  HH-Index 689.03   
  Economies of Scale 0.1212   
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Appendix 2 
 
Non-Life insurance SCP summary 
 
   Insurance Company Market share  
Cumulative 
market share  ROIC  
      
  UNIQA Versicherungen AG 40.9206% 40.9206% 0.3971% 
  Generali Holding Vienna AG 32.4380% 73.3587% 0.3381% 
  Allianz Elementar Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 4.2406% 77.5992% 0.0176% 
  Wiener Städtische Allgemeine Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 3.5569% 81.1562% 1.4656% 
  Generali Versicherung AG 2.5375% 83.6937% 0.7039% 
  UNIQA Sachversicherung AG 2.2252% 85.9188% -0.3786% 
  Interunfall Versicherung AG 2.1318% 88.0507% -0.2456% 
  Grazer Wechselseitige Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 1.8075% 89.8582% 1.9567% 
  Donau Allgemeine Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 1.8014% 91.6596% 0.2035% 
  Zürich Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 1.2384% 92.8980% 2.2955% 
  Die Niederösterreichische Versicherung 1.0377% 93.9357% 0.0451% 
  Oberösterreichische Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.9646% 94.9003% 0.7563% 
  Der Anker Allgemeine Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.6227% 95.5230% -0.0294% 
  Generali Rückversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.6064% 96.1294% 1.1180% 
  Wüstenrot Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.4048% 96.5342% -7.4698% 
  
D.A.S. Österreichische Allgemeine Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs-
Aktiengesellschaft 0.3743% 96.9085% 3.2076% 
  Tiroler Landes-Versicherungsanstalt V. a. G. 0.3319% 97.2403% 2.1578% 
  Vorarlberger Landes-Versicherung V. a. G. 0.2831% 97.5235% 1.5427% 
  Basler Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft In Österreich 0.2524% 97.7759% -3.0716% 
  VAV Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.2129% 97.9888% 0.0049% 
  Salzburger Landes-Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.2059% 98.1947% 1.0686% 
  
ARAG Österreich Allgemeine Rechtsschutzversicherungs-
Aktiengesellschaft 0.2030% 98.3977% 3.6283% 
  UNIQA Personenversicherung AG 0.2027% 98.6004% 1.2089% 
  
Österreichische Hagelversicherung Versicherungsverein auf 
Gegenseitigkeit 0.1839% 98.7843% -3.3963% 
  Österreichische Kreditversicherung Coface AG 0.1534% 98.9376% 1.8645% 
  Raiffeisen Versicherung AG 0.1324% 99.0700% -0.5157% 
  Kärntner Landesversicherung auf Gegenseitigkeit 0.1306% 99.2006% 0.9302% 
  OeKB Versicherung AG 0.1153% 99.3159% 3.0473% 
  Victoria-Volksbanken Versicherungsaktiengesellschaft 0.1018% 99.4177% 0.0232% 
  Merkur Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0872% 99.5049% 4.1998% 
  Prisma Kreditversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.0803% 99.5852% 0.0000% 
  Sparkassen Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0751% 99.6603% 4.2127% 
  SK Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0614% 99.7218% 0.9533% 
  
Österreichische Beamtenversicherung Versicherungsverein auf 
Gegenseitigkeit 0.0592% 99.7809% 6.7559% 
  Europäische Reiseversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0515% 99.8324% 1.9119% 
  Porsche Versicherungs- Aktiengesellschaft 0.0428% 99.8752% 4.6691% 
  Garant Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.0405% 99.9157% 0.0000% 
  Union Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft 0.0262% 99.9420% 14.6190%
  CALL DIRECT Versicherung AG 0.0125% 99.9545% -1.4456% 
  Bank Austria Creditanstalt Versicherung AG 0.0100% 99.9645% 9.1964% 
  Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich 0.0095% 99.9740% 3.4692% 
  BAWAG-Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0074% 99.9814% 2.2097% 
  Hypo Versicherung AG 0.0057% 99.9871% 2.3933% 
  Postversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0049% 99.9920% 0.5119% 
  OAFA Versicherung AG 0.0048% 99.9967% 0.6604% 
  Quelle Lebensversicherung Aktiengesellschaft 0.0033% 100.0000% 9.6477% 
  MuKi Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit 0.0000% 100.0000% n/a 
      
  HH-Index 2784.98   
  Economies of Scale 0.4092   
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